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In recent years, the Supreme Court has often been confronted with
"ceremonial deism." As I understand the term here, ceremonial deism is
categorized by the following features. First, it is not coercive; no one is
being required to do or to say anything. Second, it involves public displays
that refer generally to God, without choosing any particular conception of
God. Third, it involves activities that are either specifically honored by
tradition or essentially indistinguishable from activities that are specifically
honored by tradition.
Ceremonial deism has a core and a periphery.' The core might be said
to include the use of the words "In God We Trust" on currency and as the
national motto, legislative prayers, public oaths that refer to God and that
use the Bible, and the use of the phrase "God Save This Honorable Court"
to begin judicial proceedings. The periphery includes the words "under
God" in the Pledge of Allegiance, prayers at public university ceremonies,
and displays of religious symbols on public property. All I mean by
ceremonial deism, then, is non-coercive public displays that refer to God in
the way that is time honored and fits with our traditions.
That's the topic. In these remarks, I have two goals. The first is to
explore how the constitutional law might evaluate ceremonial deism. In
the first part of these remarks, I will try to illuminate current constitutional
debate by attempting to identify the approaches that are behind the current
controversy.
The second goal is to argue that federal courts, including the Supreme
Court, should generally permit ceremonial deism. This means that the
Supreme Court should get out of the business of attacking references to
God, if they are in fact vindicated by tradition or if they are hard to
distinguish, in principle, from those references that are vindicated by
tradition. The underlying idea is that if a practice is longstanding and if it
does not offend existing decisions, then courts should impose a heavy
burden on those who strike down the practices. Here is an effort to free up
other institutions, including state government, from the heavy hand of
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and Department
of Political Science, University of Chicago. This essay is a lightly revised version of the
transcript of the McElroy Lecture, delivered at the University of Detroit Mercy School of
Law, on March 7, 2006. The author would like to thank members of the community of the
law school for their extraordinary kindness and generosity on that occasion. Readers are
asked to make allowances for an essay that draws on an oral presentation.
1. See Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96
COLUM. L. REv. 2083 (1996).
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constitutional law insofar as those institutions are engaging in ceremonial
deism. The harm done by ceremonial deism, if there is any, is purely
symbolic. It involves feelings rather than material effects. Note in this
regard that we have a diverse country, most of whose citizens are religious
believers. Public inferences to God should not be struck down by federal
courts in light of the kind of diversity we have.
That's the basic argument. What I'm going to do now is to begin by
exploring theories of constitutional interpretation first. After that, I will
explore ceremonial deism in particular. The theories are going to be a bit
abstract and I will be exploring four of them. Each has been with us for
about 200 years now, and they often have been in the background. We
ought to bring them to the foreground.2
The first approach to constitutional interpretation might be called
bipartisan restraint. It is associated with Oliver Wendell Holmes, who
practiced it, and to a large extent Chief Justice John Marshall, who usually
practiced it also. There is no practitioner of bipartisan restraint on the
current Supreme Court - though members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee have shown some interest in bipartisan restraint at least for the
last year.
What bipartisan means is that the Court should strike laws down only
if the violation of the Constitution is clear and unambiguous. People who
believe in bipartisan restraint emphasize that the Court is composed not by
sages but by lawyers. The Court consists of people who are educated in the
law. Advocates of bipartisan restraint think that the Constitution is
ambiguous, as it certainly is, and they insist that laws should not be struck
down unless they're unambiguously in violation of the Constitution of the
United States.
At the turn of the century a law professor named James Bradley
Thayer argued for bipartisan restraint. 3 Thayer argued that because the
American Constitution is often ambiguous, those who decide on its
meaning must inevitably exercise discretion. Laws that "will seem
unconstitutional to one man, or body of men, may reasonably not seem so
to another; ... the constitution often admits of different interpretations;...
there is often a range of choice and judgment."4  In Thayer's view,
"whatever choice is rational is constitutional. 5  Thayer's argument, in
brief, was that courts should strike down laws only "when those who have
the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but have made a
2. The approaches are explored in detail, with references, in CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING JUDGES ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA (Basic
Books 2005).
3. See James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REv. 129 (1893).
4. Id. at 144.
5. Id.
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very clear one-so clear that it is not open to rational question. ''6 The
question for courts "is not one of the mere and simple preponderance of
reasons for or against, but of what is very plain and clear, clear beyond a
reasonable doubt.",
7
I said that Oliver Wendell Holmes was a practitioner of bipartisan
restraint. As he once said, "If my fellow citizens want to go to Hell, I'll
help them. It's my job."8 Holmes has no followers on the current Court;
there's no one who is consistently willing to uphold legislation, including
in the area of separation of church and state, against constitutional attack.
So that's one approach and some of my remarks will be an effort to cover it
a little bit.
The second approach that has got a lot of attention in recent years:
originalism. Originalists believe, not that the Supreme Court should
uphold every law that is not clearly unconstitutional, but instead that the
Court should go in a time machine. The Court should recover the original
understanding of the document. Hence originalists insist that the
Constitution means what it meant at the time it was ratified. For evaluating
the idea of ceremonial deism, or separation of church and State, the task is
to recover the original understanding of those who gave us the Constitution
of the United States. This might be said to be a "time travel" conception of
the constitutional law.
There's a lot to be said on behalf of originalism. It attempts to
vindicate the rule of law by reducing the discretion of federal judges. It
insists that, instead of allowing federal judges to make their own decisions
about what religious freedom requires in a diverse society, judges ought to
figure out what We the People thought was meant by the Establishment
Clause at the time the Constitution was ratified. Here there is a democratic,
as well as a rule of law reason, for originalism.
But there are two large problems with the originalist project. The first
is it may be somewhat contradictory. If the original understanding is to be
binding, it must be because the original understanding was that the original
understanding would be binding. If the original understanding was not that
the original understanding would be binding, then the originalist project
defeats itself. For the idea of this theory to work, it has to be a case that the
people who gave us the free exercise clause and the establishment clause
and other clauses of the Constitution specifically meant their specific
understandings to bind prosperity.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 151.
8. Oliver W. Holmes, Letter from Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Mar. 4, 1920), in I
HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J.
LASKI, 1916-1935, 248-49 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953).
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Unfortunately, there's a lot of reason historically to think they did not
mean to entrench their specific views. 9  In that case, the originalist
approach defeats itself, because the approach was not that of those who
originally ratified the Constitution.
There is a further problem. The originalist approach for the
Constitution would cause serious problems for our system of rights and
with our present institutions. I'll give you just one example from the area
I'm focusing on in this set of remarks. Justice Thomas has argued that the
separation of church and state does not apply to state government.'0 It
follows, from this view, that if people wanted to establish a state church for
California or Massachusetts or Michigan that would be fine as far as the
national Constitution is concerned. And if the state wants to favor a
particular religion through funds or through any other approach, the state
government runs into no constitutional problem because the Establishment
Clause doesn't apply to state government-only to national government.
The real problem with Thomas' approach, in my view, is he's
probably right on history. It may well be a stretch to say that, as a matter of
history, the establishment clause is incorporated in the Fourteenth
Amendment according to the original understanding. He may well have
the history right, I think. But if his approach were accepted, we would so
alter our current understandings at the level of state government as to make
our system essentially unrecognizable. If we were to unleash religious
struggle on state legislature, unconstrained by the Establishment Clause,
then we would turn the United States into a very different country than it's
been for fifty years or more.
So my suggestion with respect to originalism is, first, that it may
embed a theory of interpretation that is not the theory of the original
ratifiers of the Constitution. And second, it would transform our document
in ways that would alter radically and for the worse the system of
government by which we have long lived. We have now explored two
theories of interpretation, bipartisan restraint by Justice Holmes on the one
hand, originalism of Justice Thomas on the other.
Now let me turn to the third approach which I'm going to call
perfectionism. This is an approach that has played a dominant role in the
area of religion in the last forty or fifty years. We might treat William
Brennan as the leading perfectionist in the last half-century. The
perfectionists believe that the Constitution sets out strong aspirations for
freedom in general and for religious freedom in particular." Under their
view, the particular meaning of these aspirations is transformed from one
9. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L.
REv. 885 (1985).
10. See Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49-50 (2004), reh'g
denied, 542 U.S. 961 (2004).
11. For an example of perfectionism, see RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES
(Belknap Press 2006).
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generation to another. Justice Breyer has defended a kind of perfectionist
approach to the Constitution, saying the document is not static and it
changes over time.12 Certainly Americans have learned more about how to
live with one another, and as we do, perhaps our understanding of the
requirements of religious liberty are being altered.
Many of the dominant ideas for last thirty years or so in the area of
religious liberty hold their source to this approach to constitutional
interpretation. For example, the wall of separation between church and
state is a metaphor that is the result of the perfectionist approach, trying to
make our system of religious liberty as good as it possibly can be. (I do not
mean to endorse the metaphor, which seems to me misleading, and
damaging; I mean simply to note that it is a perfectionist idea.)
Also perfectionist is the idea of "neutrality" between religion and
nonreligion or neutrality across religious. That idea is less dangerous and
damaging-indeed it has considerable appeal-but it has an unmistakable
perfectionist feature. The ratifiers of the First Amendment did not believe
in neutrality in a strong sense. The notion of neutrality between religion
and nonreligion and across religions is more a development of the last fifty
years of than in the founding period.
In my view, there is a lot of nobility to the perfectionist approach to
the Constitution, but let me outline some problems with it. The first is if
our judges are trying to perfect our constitutional ideas by trying to figure
out what free exercise means or respecting what establishment means, they
may blunder. Judges have no special access to moral or political truth. If
judges are trying to figure out how best to understand our constitutional
aspirations, it is possible that they will make our constitutional system less
perfect and not more so. If judges have no privileged access to political or
moral truth, then to entrust them with the task of putting our aspirations in
the best light is risky just because of the inevitable fallibility of judges.
Even if judges were not fallible in this way, democracy and self
government have their claims, do they not? Perfectionism threatens to
unsettle our ability to rule ourselves. If we entrust our judges with the task
of figuring out what free exercise of religion means or what respecting
establishment of religion really means, we might compromise self-
government. If we entrust judges with the task of figuring out our deepest
aspirations, we might be asking them to do something better done by our
citizens and ordinary people, not just judges.
The fourth approach, which is the final one, would be written in small
letters. It's call minimalism. Minimalists believe in little constitutional
law rather than in big heroic constitutional law. They believe that
constitutional law should be little in the two different ways. First, suppose
that the Supreme Court is confronting a problem like the use of the word,
Under God, in the Pledge of Allegiance. Minimalists want judges to take a
12. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY (Knopf 2005).
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small step and focus on the use of the words "under God" in the Pledge of
Allegiance, not a large step that resolves all sorts of questions of religious
liberty and establishment.
Hence minimalists like incremental rather than earth-shaking
decisions. They prefer nudges over earthquakes. In addition, minimalists
like shallowness rather than depth. That is very different from what you
would want in a romantic relationship or in a teacher! In constitutional
law, minimalists want shallowness for the following reason: They think
that theoretical depth, in the constitutional domain, forces judges to take
stands on issues that most deeply divide us. They want to avoid that. They
like shallowness in the form of rulings and rationale that we can all agree
on, notwithstanding our diversity and our plurality. So by shallowness, I
mean an outcome and an argument that we can accept notwithstanding our
disagreements on foundational issues. For example, people can agree right
now in the United States that government cannot censor speech unless there
is a clear and present danger. And we agree on that despite our
disagreement on theological issues and political issues. Across many
differences, we support freedom of speech against censorship. What
minimalists want to do is to achieve a big goal for a diverse nation, which
is to make it possible for people to agree where agreement is necessary,
while also making it unnecessary for people to agree where agreement is
not possible.
Justice O'Connor, recent retiree from the Supreme Court, was a
practitioner of m-inimalism.13 There are two objections to the minimalist
approach that one might make. One is that it is unpredictable. Justice
O'Connor could not easily be pigeon-holed; people didn't know how she
would vote in hard cases. And so the narrowness that she prized might be a
problem for those who want to know what the law is. Narrow decisions
leave a great deal of uncertainty. Shallowness is also a problem if the deep
theory would be right. If there is an excellent deep theory, then we should
opt for depth. But often we can't find one. And even if some people think
they have the right theory, some of our fellow citizens will not agree to it,
and it is respectful for our fellow citizens not to insist on that theory if we
can't get them to agree to it.
I am done with these abstract remarks about constitutional theory.
Now it is time to talk about ceremonial deism in particular. In terms of the
approaches I have described, it's clear that if you believe in bipartisan
restraint, as Oliver Wendell Holmes, then the answer is clear: There is
absolutely nothing wrong with the public ceremony that refers to God, that
mentions the Ten Commandments, or that uses the Bible. Indeed, there is
nothing wrong with public displays of the Ten Commandments, or with the
inclusion of the words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance. Those
13. See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1899, 1901-02
(2006).
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who believe in bipartisan restraint find ceremonial deism easy and fine.
The Constitution does not clearly or unambiguously forbid references, in
public, to God. For those who believe in bipartisan restraint, these cases do
not present serious challenges; judges should simply back off.
Something similar is probably true if you are an originalist and if you
accept the originalist approach of Justices Scalia and Thomas. Under that
approach, ceremonial deism is constitutionally acceptable. Justice
Thomas' view, if you will recall, is that the Establishment Clause does not
apply to states at all. If a university or state wants to recognize the
existence of God, there is no problem. Justice Scalia does not take that
view but he is able to point to a great deal of history suggesting that
ceremonial deism is legitimate.' 4  For originalists, as for advocates of
bipartisan restraint, these questions are easy.
Many perfectionists reach a very different conclusion. They believe
that the state must be neutral as between religion and non-religion, and also
neutral as between some religions other religions.1 5 They ask: What is
neutral in state recognition of the existence of God? After all, millions of
Americans are agnostic or atheist, and many others do not accept
monotheism. For perfectionists who insist on genuine neutrality, it is clear
that ceremonial deism is in constitutional trouble, hence, for example, the
view that the pledge of the allegiance cannot constitutionally contain the
words "under God." Under this view, it is not possible to celebrate God
constitutionally.
The minimalists are split. Some of them, such as Justice Breyer, want
to go case by case,16 making fine decisions amongst different kinds of
religious displays. For such minimalists, it is important to pay close
attention to context, which will make some forms of ceremonial deism
constitutionally valid and other forms invalid. I want to identify here the
intellectual parent of minimalism and explore how his views might bear on
the problem.
I mean to refer here to the English social theorist Edmund Burke, who
believed that each of us has a private stock of wisdom.17 Each person in
this room has such a private stock. But what each of us knows, as an
individual, is pitiful really compared to what tradition knows. This is not
because the individuals who constitute traditions were smarter or wiser
than each of us; it is because traditions contain the knowledge of so
many-not of dozens or hundreds or thousands but of millions of
14. See Scalia opinions in the Ten Commandments cases (Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S.
Ct. 2854, 2864 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring); McCreary Cty., KY, v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct.
2722, 2748 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting and joining in Part II and III of the majority
opinion)).
15. See Epstein, supra note 1, for citations and careful elaboration.
16. See Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2868 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
17. For elaboration and citations, see Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105
MICH. L. REV. 353 (2006).
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individual minds. Burke rejected the revolutionary temperament because of
its theoretical ambition. 18  Burke's key claim is that the "science of
constructing a commonwealth, or reforming it, is, like every other
experimental science, not to be taught a priori."'19 To make this argument,
Burke opposes theories and abstractions, developed by individual minds, to
traditions, built up by many minds over long periods. In his most vivid
passage, Burke writes:
We wished at the period of the Revolution, and do now wish, to
derive all we possess as an inheritance from our forefathers....
The science of government being therefore so practical in itself,
and intended for such practical purposes, a matter which requires
experience, and even more experience than any person can gain
in his whole life, however sagacious and observing he may be, it
is with infinite caution that any man ought to venture upon
pulling down an edifice which has answered in any tolerable
degree, for ages the common purposes of society, or on building
it up again, without having models and patterns of approved
utility before his eyes.20
Thus Burke stresses the need to rely on experience, and in particular
the experience of generations; and he objects to "pulling down an edifice,"
a metaphor capturing the understanding of social practices as reflecting the
judgments of numerous people extending over time. It is for this reason
that Burke describes the "spirit of innovation" as "the result of a selfish
temper and confined views," 21 and offers the term "prejudice" as one of
enthusiastic approval, noting that "instead of casting away all our old
prejudices, we cherish them to a very considerable degree., 22 Emphasizing
the critical importance of stability, Burke adds a reference to "the evils of
inconstancy and versatility, ten thousand times worse than those of
obstinacy and the blindest prejudice., 23
In short, Burke thought that legal structures and individual rights
should be built up with careful reference to longstanding practice. In the
domain of religion, this was, in many ways, Chief Justice Rehnquist's
approach to constitutional questions. Chief Justice Rehnquist analyzed hard
questions by reference to our traditions. Strikingly, Chief Justice
Rehnquist's defense of the use of the words "under God" in the Pledge of
Allegiance is an almost entirely Burkean exercise, stressing practices rather
18. Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in THE PORTABLE
EDMUND BURKE, 416-51 (Isaac Kramnick ed. 1999) (1790).
19. Id. at 442.
20. Id. at 451.
21. Id. at 428.
22. Id. at 451.
23. Id.
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than reasons for practices. 24 Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist's view of the
Establishment Clause has a persistent Burkean feature, at least insofar as he
would permit public recognition of God by reference not to theories or
principle, but by reference to history alone.25
At least for ceremonial deism, I think that Chief Justice Rehnquist was
right. The Burkean approach that bases constitutional law on longstanding
traditions, rather than on theories and abstractions, has a lot to recommend
it.
What I've just done is to suggest that minimalists who are inspired by
Burke have no problem with ceremonial deism. So too for the originalists
and for those who believe in bipartisan restraint. It is only the
perfectionists who have trouble. I think the Burkean minimalists are right,
and I want to clarify that judgment in the remarks that remain.
One objection of ceremonial deism is that if we allow it, we are on a
slippery slope to invocation specifically of religious values in a way that
would undermine rather than support our constitutional tradition of respect
for diversity. I want to address that objection by building up cases now
with minimalist fashion. And I'm going to start with the cases in which the
argument for striking down legislation is strongest. I will end with cases in
which the argument for striking down legislation is weakest. And there is
going to be a specific point in which we switch from the imposition of
particular religious convictions, which is not legitimate, to ceremonial
deism, which is legitimate. I hope that by virtue of the specificity of the
cases, the slippery slope problem will dissipate.
First, the strongest case for invalidating legislation involves
mandatory school prayer. The prohibition of school prayer has been with
us for a long, long time and it's very hard when you're dealing with
children to speak of ceremonial deism rather than inculcation of the state's
preferred religious beliefs. I do not mean to suggest that it is entirely clear
that the Supreme Court was originally right to strike down school prayer;
the issues were hard. But the Court's decisions are well engrained and my
defense of ceremonial deism does not support mandatory school prayers.
A somewhat harder case but also a good one for Supreme Court
invalidation was a case from a few years ago when a state legislature said
that the Ten Commandments had to be posted on a wall of every public
school classroom. 26 That's not the easiest case in the world but it's not so
24. See Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 26-32 (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring). What is striking about Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion is its nearly
exclusive reliance on historical practices, treated as closely analogous to the use of the
words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance. Emphasizing those practices, Chief Justice
Rehnquist makes almost no effort to defend them in principle, in a way that fits well with
one understanding of Burke.
25. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005) (plurality opinion of
Rehnquist, C.J.).
26. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
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far from school prayer. This case involved children, not adults. It's not
purely ceremonial; it's the educational setting. To display the Ten
Commandments on every public school classroom seems to be an effort to
inculcate in children a set of religious convictions, and it is not the states'
business to do that.
The third case is a little harder for an aggressive Supreme Court role.
The third case is also a case from a few years ago, in which the state
legislature didn't mandate any prayers, but said one minute would be set
aside for voluntary prayer or meditation.27 This is harder for the Supreme
Court to strike down, because there is no reference to any particular set of
religious conviction. But in my view, this case did not involve ceremonial
deism, for it was an effect to enlist public schools in the process of
religious practice, and the Supreme Court knew that. The Court was
probably right to strike the legislation down.
Thus far, I have given three cases in which the Supreme Court
properly validated the legislation; but now we're going to ceremonial
deism. Last year the Supreme Court was confronted with two cases in
which the Ten Commandments were put on public property. If the
argument thus far is correct, the Supreme Court was right, in one of those
cases, to accept the display of the Ten Commandments on public property,
as part of a general celebration of our history. But the Supreme Court was
wrong to strike down the posting of the Ten Commandments on the
courthouse. After all, the courthouse had many other historical influences
displayed, including secular ones. This was not a case in which religious
symbols were the only ones. I suggest that a display of the Ten
Commandments, if it is part of a series of displays that are not solely
religious, is part of legitimate ceremonial deism. The state is entitled to
recognize that the Ten Commandments helped to give rise to the legal
system in which we now live. To recognize that role is not to commit
yourself, as the state did not, to a particular set of religious convictions.
It follows that the Supreme Court was wrong to set its face against the
Ten Commandments in the courthouses as part of the historical display.
Now let's consider cases that are easier for the government, and whose
facts make it harder and harder for the Supreme Court to play an aggressive
role. In what seems on reflection to be a surprising decision, the Court
struck down a public prayer at a graduation ceremony.28 Why is it invalid
for graduation ceremonies to include prayers, if those ceremonies contain a
great deal more than prayers? The relevant ceremony did not require
anyone to do anything. It did not use public funds. It did not mandate or
coerce any behavior. It simply recognized the existence of religious
convictions in the relevant community. From the standpoint of Burkean
minimalism, the Court's decision was a blunder.
27. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
28. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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Let's now pause over the Pledge of Allegiance which we began. In
my view, the ceremonial deism that is involved here is not illegitimate, and
the Supreme Court ought to find the use of the words "under God" to be
constitutional and not problematic. The Pledge of Allegiance, which many
of us said in school, is not a religious ceremony. It is not itself a prayer.
There are two words in the Pledge, and these two words are a recognition
of what 90% or so of Americans believe, in a context in which no one is
forced to say those words if they don't want to do so. The use of the words
"under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance might offend some people, but it
hardly establishes an official religion. In context, these two words are not
the sort of thing the Supreme Court should concern itself with invalidating.
Here is the last case: a Christmas display in which a badly divided
Supreme Court rejected a constitutional attack.29 The Court said that the
Christmas display served a secular purpose, which was to celebrate the
holiday. At first glance, the Court's idea that a Christmas display has a
secular purpose seems quite odd. It is Christmas, after all, not Holiday-
ness. But on reflection, there is a lot to be said for the Court's reasoning.
What the locality was essentially doing in this case was recognizing that a
number of citizens celebrate Christmas; the locality was acknowledging
that practice. This was not by the way a Christmas display to the exclusion
of a Hanukkah display or other displays; they were there too. The locality
was going beyond ceremonial deism, to be sure. It was not simply
recognizing the existence of God. But its Christmas display was part of a
general holiday celebration, not an effort to inculcate a particular set of
religious convictions.
By way of summary: I have had two goals here. The first is to try to
sketch some theories of constitutional interpretation and to bring them to
bear on religious liberty and the Establishment Clause in particular. The
theories, to recapitulate, are bipartisan restraint, originalism, perfectionism,
and minimalism.
My second goal is to defend ceremonial deism. I have argued in favor
of an approach that recognizes our history and respect for religious
practices and beliefs in a way that doesn't force anyone to do anything, but
that acknowledges widespread commitments. Such acknowledgement is
not an offense to the Constitution of the United States. Those are my two
goals but I actually have a broader goal that I haven't yet identified. In our
society today, we have real issues of justice and liberty and equality that
constitutional law might help to address. Some of those issues involve the
war on terror-the uses and limits of presidential power in the context of
national security and the place of civil liberties too. In addition, we have
continuing free speech issues on university campuses and state legislatures.
In the religious context, we have very serious constitutional issues
emerging that have to do with the teaching of intelligent design in public
29. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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schools. Mandatory teaching of intelligent design raises serious
constitutional problems going well beyond what I've described here.
The attack on ceremonial deism, I suggest, is a diversion from the
serious issues. That attack insults religious believers and simultaneously
insults American citizens more generally. The insult does not do a lot of
good for nonbelievers and members of religious minorities. Ours is a
secular Constitution; there is no doubt about that. But under that secular
Constitution, it is nonetheless possible to celebrate God constitutionally.
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